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COVID-19: Isolating the Problems in Privacy
Protection for Individuals with Substance Use
Disorder
Kimberly Johnson†

I.

INTRODUCTION

Even in ordinary times, addiction can be a disease of isolation.1
Substance use disorder2 (SUD), which is commonly referred to as drug
addiction, is a chronic disorder that impacts neural networks in the
brain and the central immune system.3 Individuals with SUD are at
increased risk for COVID-19 and its adverse outcomes, including death
and hospitalization.4 The pandemic has introduced social distancing orders and exacerbated housing instability and unemployment, interfering with SUD treatment.5 Prior to the pandemic, disparate access to

†

B.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2017; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago
Law School, 2022. Thank you to the many mentors who have inspired me along the way; this
Comment marks the beginning of a lifetime of legal learning. Another huge thank you to my family
and the members of the 2021–22 Board of The University of Chicago Legal Forum for their support.
1
See Emma Goldberg, “Relapsing Left and Right”: Trying to Overcome Addiction in a Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/nyregion/addiction-treatment-coronavirus-new-york-new-jersey.html [https://perma.cc/CHK8-X2JD] (explaining that feelings of loneliness can exacerbate relapse risk in individuals suffering from addiction).
2
Michael P. Botticelli & Howard K. Koh, Changing the Language of Addiction, 316 JAMA
1361, 1361 (2016) (explaining why terms such as “substance use disorder,” rather than “addiction,”
are important in fighting stigmatization and encouraging treatment).
3
See Jian-feng Liu & Jun-xu Li, Drug Addiction: A Curable Mental Disorder?, 39 ACTA
PHARMACOLOGICA SINICA 1823, 1823 (2018).
4
Quan Qiu Wang et al., COVID-19 Risk and Outcomes in Patients with Substance Use Disorders: Analyses from Electronic Health Records in the United States, 26 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY
30, 35 (2020).
5
Leslie Francis, Illegal Substance Abuse and Protection from Discrimination in Housing and
Employment: Reversing the Exclusion of Illegal Substance Abuse as a Disability, 2019 UTAH L.
REV. 891, 892 (2019) (noting that housing and employment are important factors in recovery for
individuals with SUD).
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SUD treatment was already a national concern due to the ongoing opioid epidemic.6 Access concerns, along with concerns about privacy, stigmatization, and discrimination, continue to pose problems for those
with SUD.7
The pandemic has reinvigorated discussions about the legal protections available to those experiencing stigmatization and discrimination
on the basis of SUD records.8 In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act),9 which,
inter alia, amended the privacy framework for SUD records.10 This privacy framework is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 290-dd; its implementing regulations are in the Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient
Records11 rule (hereinafter referred to as “Part 2”).12 The CARES Act
amendments (hereinafter referred to as the “CARES Act Modifications”) substantially alter statutory provisions regarding patient consent13 and include a new antidiscrimination standard.14 Patient privacy
advocates view reduced consent requirements as reducing the degree of
control patients can exercise over the sharing of their records.15 Broadened record sharing may be problematic for SUD patients due to persistent stigmatization and associated discrimination.16
This Comment evaluates the extent to which the CARES Act Modifications sustainably balance individual privacy expectations with
strong public interests in obtaining SUD records and integrated care.
Moreover, it suggests avenues to fill gaps in protection for individuals
with SUD after their information has been disclosed.

6

See generally Ashley Monzel, The Hydra Paradox of the Opioid Epidemic: Why Supply-Side
Responses Will Fuel Rather Than Curb the Opioid Epidemic, 28 ELDER L.J. 145, 163 (2020).
7
Charise R. Frazier & Patricia Connelly, The Tide is Changing: Behavioral Health and Primary Care Integration Challenges with 42 CFR Part 2 Compliance, 22 J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE 41, 41 (2020).
8
See, e.g., Nicolas Terry, Perspectives on the Opioid Overdose Epidemic, 45 HUM. RTS. MAG.
22, 22 (2020).
9
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9080) (2020).
10
Frazier & Connelly, supra note 7, at 42.
11
42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1–2.67 (2017).
12
“Part 2” is the commonly-used shorthand for the “42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1–2.67” regulations. Experts, legislators, and providers use the “Part 2” terminology when referencing the regulations.
See, e.g., Substance Abuse Confidentiality Regulations, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.samhsa.gov/about-us/who-we-are/laws-regulations
/confidentiality-regulations-faqs [https://perma.cc/WG92-Y4H6].
13
See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(b)(1).
14
See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(i).
15
Aimee N. C. Campbell et al., Interpretation and Integration of the Federal Substance Use
Privacy Protection Rule in Integrated Health Systems: A Qualitative Analysis, 97 J. SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT 41, 43 (2019).
16
See Botticelli & Koh, supra note 2, at 1361.
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The Comment will proceed as follows. Part II outlines the existing
fragmented privacy protections for SUD records as well as the existing
antidiscrimination protections for individuals with SUD. Part III examines the CARES Act Modifications. Part IV argues that, although Part
2 provides individuals with SUD some degree of control over their records, privacy protections are fragmented, unpredictable, and unstable.
This Part suggests that heightened antidiscrimination protections will
ultimately provide the most sustainable protection for individuals with
SUD, but robust protections will require courts to reevaluate existing
antidiscrimination standards. This Comment concludes that, with
these changes, courts can help to reduce barriers to treatment and avoid
widespread treatment discontinuity in a future pandemic.
II. “PART 2”: PRIVACY AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER
While the clinical concept of substance use disorder has changed
over time, the legal protections for individuals with SUD have largely
stayed the same. This Part will explain the history of SUD and analyze
the existing need for stringent privacy protections for individuals with
SUD. It will survey the patchwork of privacy protections available for
individuals receiving SUD treatment and evaluate the synergy between
privacy and antidiscrimination protections for SUD treatment records.
Ultimately, this Part will conclude that the unpredictability of both privacy and antidiscrimination protections leave individuals with SUD
vulnerable to stigmatization and discrimination.
A. Substance Use Disorder: Definition and Impact
In 2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) declared the nationwide opioid epidemic a public health emergency in response to the overwhelming rate of opioid overdose deaths.17
Currently, an estimated 130 people die every day from opioid overdoses,18 and opioid-related deaths in the United States exceed the number of deaths related to car accidents.19

17

Monzel, supra note 6, at 146. These deaths were not limited to prescription opioid use––
heroin and other illicit opioids contributed to these deaths. Id.
18
Melissa A. Soliz, Don’t Let Privacy Protections Be the Enemy of Good: How Privacy Laws
Are Stymieing Efforts to Most Effectively Treat Substance Use Disorders and Combat the Opioid
Epidemic, 21 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 13, 13 (2019).
19
Preventable Deaths: Odds of Dying, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL: INJ. FACTS, https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/all-injuries/preventable-death-overview/odds-of-dying/
[https://perma.cc/JVS8CRAZ] (last accessed Dec. 11, 2020).
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Drug policy has historically treated substance use as the result of
a “deviant moral failing,” but the narrative shifted with the opioid crisis.20 Rather than employing a moral-defect framing, media and policymakers alike have characterized opioid addiction as a complex health
condition and shifted the blame to clinical overprescription and aggressive pharmaceutical marketing.21 A medicine-centric view is aligned
with the modern understanding of SUD among healthcare providers.22
The prevailing diagnostic resource, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), classifies SUD as a “cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the individual continues to use the substance despite significant substancerelated problems.”23 “Repeated, regular misuse of substances”—both illicit and legal—can qualify an individual for a diagnosis if other criteria
are met.24 Not all criteria are necessary for a diagnosis under the DSM5, which categorizes symptoms as mild, moderate, or severe.25
As scientists have begun to understand the disorder, they have suggested a number of therapies that may reduce symptoms and dampen
relapse risk.26 Overall, the outlook remains dire: The clinical efficacy of
laboratory-approved treatment models is limited, and avoiding relapse
remains a huge challenge for recovering individuals.27 Those seeking
treatment for SUD must surmount hurdles including insurance difficulties,28 provider stigmatization and discrimination,29 and fear of social costs—such as adverse effects at work or in the community.30 Estimates suggest that only one in ten Americans with SUD access
treatment,31 which may indicate that treatment barriers remain significant.
20

Jennifer D. Oliva, Policing Opioid Use Disorder in a Pandemic, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 90,
91 (2020).
21
Id.
22
See generally Dennis McCarty et al., Treatment and Prevention of Opioid Use Disorder:
Challenges and Opportunities, 39 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 525 (2018).
23
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th
ed. 2013).
24
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN
AMERICA: THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 1-16 (2016)
(ebook).
25
Id. at 1-6 to 1-16.
26
Liu & Li, supra note 3, at 1823–27 (suggesting pharmacological interventions, brain stimulation, and behavioral treatment methods as potential therapies for SUD).
27
Id. at 1823.
28
Botticelli & Koh, supra note 2, at 1361.
29
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 24, at 7-7, 78.
30
Botticelli & Koh, supra note 2, at 1361.
31
Lipi Roy, Addiction Treatment Facilities: Are They Prepared for the COVID-19 Coronavirus
Outbreak?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lipiroy/2020/03/16/addiction-
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Treatment providers traditionally separated treatment for SUD
from general healthcare,32 but advocates have recently pushed toward
“integrated care.”33 Integrated care refers to a comprehensive system of
treatment services that tracks patients over time and through a holistic
array of health services, including “prevention, early intervention,
treatment, continuing care, and recovery support.”34 Providers have
come to see integrated care as a necessary shift in SUD treatment models.35 Yet a long history of segregated care has persistently impeded adequate care options for individuals with SUD.36 For one, segregated care
is thought to reinforce the idea that SUD is different from other medical
conditions.37 Until recently, few insurers offered comparable reimbursement for SUD treatment services relative to other conditions.38 Moreover, healthcare providers themselves perpetuate stigmatization of individuals with SUD by carrying personal beliefs into their professional
work.39 While there is evidence that the tide is turning,40 more certainly
needs to be done.41
B. The Privacy Problem
While SUD is increasingly integrated into generalized healthcare
systems, research suggests that the public continues to perceive addiction as more stigmatizing than other conditions, including other mental
disorders.42 Likely, the erroneous perception that individuals with SUD
have control over their disorder—and thus, are more responsible for
treatment-facilities-are-they-prepared-for-covid-19/?sh=3591453344ea
[https://perma.cc/N92JBSNL].
32
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM, SERVS., supra note 24, at 1-8.
33
Id. at 1-20.
34
Id. at 4-3.
35
Id. at 1-18.
36
Id. at 1-19.
37
See id.
38
Id. at 1-20.
39
See generally Elizabeth M. Stone et al., The Role of Stigma in U.S. Primary Care Physicians’
Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder, 221 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1 (2021) (surveying primary care provider attitudes toward opioid use disorder and finding that higher stigmatizing attitudes among providers were correlated with a lower rates of prescribing medication-assisted
treatment and lower levels of support for treatment access policies); Kathleen A. Crapanzano et
al., The Association Between Perceived Stigma and Substance Use Disorder Treatment Outcomes:
A Review, 10 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & REHAB. 1 (2019) (discussing the relationship between selfstigma, healthcare provider stigma, and perceived social stigma).
40
Botticelli & Koh, supra note 2, at 1362 (citing the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 and Affordable Care Act as examples of recent efforts to promote treatment accessibility).
41
See, e.g., Claire E. Blevins et al., Gaps in the Substance Use Disorder Treatment Referral
Process: Provider Perceptions, 12 J. ADDICTION MED. 273, 279 (2018).
42
Kimberly Goodyear et al., Opioid Use and Stigma: The Role of Gender, Language and Precipitating Events, 185 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 339, 441 (2018).
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their behavior—contributes to this persistent stigma.43 Such stigma has
led to governmental concern that fear of discrimination impacts the decision to seek out treatment.44 Concern about treatment deterrence has
motivated heightened privacy protections for SUD treatment records.45
To understand why stringent protections for these records continue to
be necessary, it is important to explore the limitations of existing privacy protections for individuals with SUD, including constitutional,
common law, and statutory protections.
1.

The Constitution (currently) provides no solution to the SUD
privacy problem

There is no explicit privacy clause in the U.S. Constitution.46 That
said, courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive
due process protection to protect privacy in some situations,47 and in
Griswold v. Connecticut,48 the Supreme Court found that the right to
privacy was a penumbral right implicit in the Constitution’s text.49 The
Court has since held that the constitutional right to privacy covers a
“zone of privacy” that includes individual autonomy in decisions involving one’s body and family.50 The Court clarified the concept of a “zone of
privacy” in Whalen v. Roe,51 a landmark case that applied the right to
privacy to the release of prescription information to public officials.52
In Whalen, the Court upheld a New York statute which required
that the state be provided a copy of every prescription for certain drugs
for the purpose of maintaining a centralized computer file.53 The file
was intended to aid in monitoring and investigating prescription drug

43

Id.
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 24, at 6-33.
45
Id.
46
Lauren Newman, Keep Your Friends Close and Your Medical Records Closer: Defining the
Extent to Which a Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy Protects Medical Records, 32 J.L.
& HEALTH 1, 4 (2019). The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizures,
which provides some privacy protection. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1961)
(“What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.” (internal citations omitted)). The Fourth Amendment, however, is not
the constitutional provision that courts generally interpret to support a right to information privacy.
47
Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C. L. REV. 927, 939 (2016).
48
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49
Id. at 484.
50
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
51
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 591.
44
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abuse.54 The plaintiffs argued that patients in need of prescriptions
would decline treatment due to fear that the information would stigmatize them as drug addicts.55 Two parents testified that their children
would be stigmatized by the filing system, and one of these children had
been taken off his medication due to this concern.56 Three adult patients
testified to their fear of stigmatization and discrimination in the event
of disclosure, and four physicians testified to their observations of patient fear and concern.57 The state countered that public disclosure of
this information was explicitly prohibited by the statute and access was
limited.58
Despite plaintiffs’ evidence and the statute’s potentially deterrent
impact on treatment seeking, the Court recognized the state’s broad police powers in regulating drug prescriptions.59 The Court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ concerns about public disclosure as unfounded and determined that the mere requirement that private information be disclosed
to public officials was not “meaningfully distinguishable from a host of
other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many
facets of health care.”60 The Court found that disclosure of private medical information to healthcare providers is often essential to treatment,
“even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of
the patient.”61
While the Court subsequently declined to extend Whalen beyond
its facts, the majority opinion delineated two kinds of privacy interests
that form the foundation for the modern conception of privacy in
healthcare records.62 The Court determined that the zone of privacy extends to two types of interests: (1) independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions; and (2) an individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.63 The latter interest, often referred to as

54

Id. at 592. Prescription records included information such as the prescribing physician, dispensing pharmacy, drug, dosage, and patient name, address, and age. Id. at 593.
55
Id. at 595.
56
Id. at 596 n.16.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 594–95.
59
Id. at 598.
60
Id. at 602.
61
Id.; see also id. at 602 n.29 (comparing the requirements to similar requirements in instances of venereal disease, child abuse, injuries by deadly weapons, and certifications of fetal
death).
62
See, e.g., Christopher R. Smith, Somebody’s Watching Me: Protecting Patient Privacy in Prescription Health Information, 36 VT. L. REV. 931, 953 (2012) (using Whalen as a scaffold to discuss
modern discourse regarding privacy in healthcare).
63
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–600. In particular, the Court determined that any such right to
privacy would come from the “liberty interest” prong of the Fourteenth Amendment. Larry J.
Pittman, The Elusive Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 19 NEV. L.J. 135, 150 (2018).
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the “right to information privacy,” has been referenced in cases since
Whalen.64 But because the Whalen Court merely determined that a
right to information privacy may exist, later decisions have not fully
embraced the interest as constitutionally protected.65 For example, the
Court’s subsequent decision in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services66 affirmed the right to privacy in personal matters but determined
that an individual’s expectation of information privacy must outweigh
the government’s interest in the disclosure for that interest to be protected.67 In National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson,68
the Court assumed there was a right to information privacy without
deciding that the right existed.69
Thus, Whalen and subsequent Supreme Court decisions give lower
courts little guidance for information privacy cases. The Whalen Court
left unclear which circumstances would constitute a violation of the information privacy interest and failed to delineate the constitutional
treatment that courts should use when assessing that interest.70 Every
federal circuit court except the D.C. Circuit71 has interpreted Whalen to
establish a right to information privacy,72 but there is no consensus
among circuits on the circumstances that necessitate protection.73 It is

64

See, e.g., Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 156 (2011) (discussing
Whalen and the similarities to the case at issue with regard to information privacy interests); see
also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (discussing the “individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599)).
65
Smith, supra note 62, at 953.
66
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
67
Id. at 457–58.
68
562 U.S. 134 (2011).
69
See id. at 154.
70
Jessica C. Wilson, Note, Protecting Privacy Absent a Constitutional Right: A Plausible Solution to Safeguarding Medical Records, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 660 (2007).
71
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(declining to “enter the fray” by concluding that the “supposed right” of information privacy
exists”).
72
Newman, supra note 46, at 5; see also, e.g., Kenny v. Bartman, No. 16-2152, 2017 WL
3613601, at *6 (6th Cir. May 19, 2017); Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2014); Chasensky
v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088, 1095–96 (7th Cir. 2014); Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1101 (10th
Cir. 2005); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d
1348, 1349–50 (8th Cir. 1993); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Daury
v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Hester v. Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir.
1985); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); cf. Dillard v. O’Kelley, 961 F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 2020),
cert. denied, No. 20-670, 2021 WL 78198 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2021) (emphasizing the “uncertain status
of the right to informational privacy” and determining that “[i]f a right does not clearly exist, it
cannot be clearly established”).
73
Newman, supra note 46, at 5.
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clear, however, that courts generally allow disclosure of medical information when the government’s interest in that information outweighs
the individual’s interest in privacy.74
2.

Common law and statutory privacy law provide inconsistent
protection

Whether or not a constitutional right to information privacy exists,
the confidentiality of health information is protected to some degree by
common law doctrines and statutory protections at both the federal and
state level.75 Despite ostensible protection, scholars have generally seen
information privacy law as “neither comprehensive nor consistent.”76
Until Congress enacted recent federal statutory protections, states
were the primary regulators of health information under state constitutional, common law, and statutory provisions.77 Medical ethics and a
common law duty of confidentiality have formed the historical foundation for protection following unauthorized disclosure of health information.78 Courts have recognized actions under legal theories including
invasion of privacy, implied breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary
relationship.79 Recovery under these theories is far from assured,80 and
protection under these doctrines is limited.81 Common law protections
generally require a special relationship, such as a physician-patient relationship.82 This limitation is substantial because health information
access is not restricted to physicians; hospitals, insurance companies,
and government programs can access personal health information.83
Moreover, the existence and scope of state-level physician-patient privileges vary, and no federal privilege exists.84

74

Id. at 7.
Michael J. Saks et al., Granular Patient Control of Personal Health Information: Federal
and State Law Considerations, 58 JURIMETRICS J. 411, 417 (2018) (discussing the “network of federal and state statutes and regulations” that have “added substantially to the protections against
disclosure of patient health records”).
76
Id.
77
Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal
Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 327, 327 (2002).
78
Saks et al., supra note 75, at 416.
79
Pritts, supra note 77, at 330–31.
80
Id. at 331.
81
Grace-Marie Mowery, Comment, A Patient’s Right of Privacy in Computerized Pharmacy
Records, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 697, 714 (1998).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 715.
84
Jenna Phipps, State of Confusion: The HIPAA Privacy Rule and State Physician-Patient
Privilege Laws in Federal Question Cases, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 159, 159 (2007).
75
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Shortcomings of HIPAA

Due to inconsistent state protection, the federal government recognized the need for national unity in privacy law.85 This recognition led
to the enactment of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act86 (HIPAA) in 1996.87 The HIPAA Privacy Rule88 safeguards protected health information (PHI).89 PHI is health data that
can be used to identify an individual patient on some “reasonable basis.”90 Only covered entities—including healthcare plans, clearinghouses, and certain providers and their business associates—are restrained by HIPAA.91 Covered entities, however, may disclose or use
PHI without the consent of the individual if used for treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.92 Such use is restricted to the information that is minimally necessary to accomplish the intended purpose
of the use or disclosure.93
HIPAA continues to establish national standards for patient records,94 but it sets only a protective floor that does not displace more
stringent state laws.95 Therefore, states continue to play an important
role in protecting health information by imposing stricter obligations
beyond those required in HIPAA.96 State-level privacy protections are
important because HIPAA leaves gaps in protection as information is
shared throughout the healthcare system.97 For example, HIPAA only
covers a limited group of persons and organizations and does not cover
employers and life insurers.98 It also does not cover third-party nonmedical social services, which may be instrumental for providing comprehensive treatment.99

85

See id.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
87
Phipps, supra note 84, at 161.
88
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462
(Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164).
89
Id.
90
Frank Qin, The Debilitating Scope of Care Coordination Under HIPAA, 98 N.C. L. REV.
1395, 1406 (2020).
91
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019).
92
Qin, supra note 90, at 1408.
93
Id. at 1408–09.
94
Elizabeth Schaper et al., Substance Use Disorder Patient Privacy and Comprehensive Care
in Integrated Health Care Settings, 13 PSYCH. SERVS. 105, 106 (2016).
95
Saks et al., supra note 75, at 417.
96
Pritts, supra note 77, at 341.
97
Id. at 343.
98
Id. at 344.
99
Qin, supra note 90, at 1443.
86
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Another limitation of HIPAA is that it does not provide a private
right of action, which practically reduces enforcement of the statute.100
To establish a claim under HIPAA, an individual must first file a complaint to HHS.101 After receiving the complaint, HHS conducts an investigation into the allegation.102 The Secretary of HHS has complete
discretion in determining whether or not to impose a civil monetary
penalty or turn a case over to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution.103 Often, HHS will “work[ ] informally with health care organizations to achieve compliance without implementing any sanctions.”104 Lack of HIPAA enforcement has led some scholars to argue
that a private right of action is necessary in order to do justice to aggrieved patients.105 Typically, HHS has enforced complaints that have
a wide impact before using resources to address isolated violations,
leaving individual patients with little recourse.106
Recently, some state courts have determined that HIPAA can create a standard of care for health information protection, allowing
HIPAA violations to form the foundation for state tort actions that can
provide individual patients some relief.107 Specifically, state courts have
found that HIPAA, like state laws and professional codes, can establish
a standard of care under a negligence theory.108 This duty of care applies despite the fact that HIPAA does not expressly provide a private
right of action.109 Such an approach can help fill gaps in privacy protection and deter noncompliance.110
While scholars see HIPAA as public recognition of the need for
heightened privacy protections in the digital age,111 statutory and com-

100

Pritts, supra note 79, at 344. Federal courts have also declined to interpret an implied private right of action in the absence of an explicit right. Jack Brill, Note, Giving HIPAA Enforcement
Room to Grow: Why There Should Not (Yet) Be a Private Cause of Action, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2105, 2120 (2008).
101
Brill, supra note 100, at 2115–16.
102
Id. at 2116.
103
Id. at 2106.
104
Id.
105
Id. But see Roger Hsieh, Improving HIPAA Enforcement and Protecting Patient Privacy in
a Digital Healthcare Environment, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 175, 215–218 (2014).
106
Pritts, supra note 77, at 344; see also Austin Rutherford, Byrne: Closing the Gap Between
HIPAA and Patient Privacy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 210 (2016) (emphasizing that even when
sanctions are imposed, individuals receive no portion of the penalty).
107
See id. at 203–04.
108
Evan M. Wooten, The State of Data-Breach Litigation and Enforcement: Before the 2013
Mega Breaches and Beyond, 24 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SECTION
ST. BAR CAL. 229, 239–40 (2015).
109
Id. at 240.
110
Rutherford, supra note 106, at 204.
111
See, e.g., Phipps, supra note 84, at 176.
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mon law protections for information privacy continue to leave significant gaps in protection.112 Congress intended HIPAA to set a floor that
balanced the needs of the individual with the needs of society,113 but the
framework for this balancing remains unclear.114 The public interests
in integrated care, government monitoring of prescription records, and
the financial security of the healthcare system all counterbalance individual expectations of privacy.115 A standard-of-care approach may help
to fill gaps in protection, but this approach has not been adopted in
every jurisdiction.116
C. Part 2: An Answer to Privacy Concerns?
Information privacy protection under constitutional, common law,
and statutory provisions is fragmented and inconsistent, with gaps that
are not unique to SUD.117 In the early 1970s, government actors began
to show heightened concern for SUD information privacy gaps in particular due to the high degree of stigmatization that individuals with
SUD face.118 This concern was piqued by problematic instances of patient methadone119 records being used in nontreatment settings, such
as criminal cases.120 Disclosed SUD information also posed problems in
circumstances beyond the courtroom.121 Disclosures to insurers or employers, for example, could make it difficult for patients to obtain disability or life insurance, as well as maintain employment.122

112

See Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information Privacy, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 975, 995 (2016) (“Statutory and common law protections for patient
information remain patchy.”).
113
Stacey A. Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2019).
114
Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439,
1441–47 (2002) (suggesting that, more often than not, policymakers attempt to reach a balance
through ad hoc considerations).
115
See Joshua D.W. Collins, Note, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a Private Right of Action to
Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV. 199, 233 (2007).
116
Rutherford, supra note 106, at 216–17.
117
Id.
118
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 24, at 6-33;
see also Schaper et al., supra note 94, at 106. Part 2 predates HIPAA, which was enacted in 1996.
119
Methadone is a drug that is used as part of treatment programs for addiction to heroin or
opioids. See Methadone, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/addiction/what-is-methadone#1 [https://perma.cc/EAS2-YHS2] (last accessed Aug. 6, 2021).
120
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 24, at 6-33.
121
Id. at 6-34.
122
Id.
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These concerns led to federal legislation that specifically protects
SUD records.123 Part 2 was promulgated in 1975124 and implements
§ 543 of the Public Health Service Act.125 Congress intended Part 2 to
ensure that a patient receiving treatment for SUD in a Part 2 program
would not face adverse consequences due to treatment participation.126
Patient privacy advocates hoped to diminish the use of SUD records in
criminal proceedings as well as domestic proceedings such as those related to child custody, divorce, or employment.127 Part 2 continues to
“place[ ] especially stringent protections around all information that
identifies patients as either having a SUD or having had a SUD in the
past,” including treatment details, diagnoses, and enrollment in SUD
programs.128
Importantly, Part 2 initially provided stringent privacy protections
that extend beyond HIPAA’s protective floor.129 Scholars celebrated
these protections as a victory for patient privacy advocates.130 Over
time, however, healthcare providers began to voice concern that Part
2’s protections were incongruous with the changing face of SUD treatment models.131
D. The Part 2 Problem
As the opioid epidemic raged on unhindered by treatment facilitation efforts, providers pushed for SUD treatment integration into general medical practice.132 When Congress enacted Part 2, and for most of
Part 2’s history, standalone addiction treatment settings operated in-

123

OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DISCLOSURE OF SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER PATIENT RECORDS: HOW DO I
EXCHANGE PART 2 DATA?, https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/how-do-i-exchange-part2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YK4G-EQ8N] (last accessed Aug. 6, 2021); see also 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2.
124
OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., supra note 123; see also 42
U.S.C. § 290dd-2.
125
42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2.
126
Schaper et al., supra note 94, at 106 (“Lawmakers wanted to ensure that individuals in
need of SUD treatment would not avoid treatment for fear of arrest; loss of parental rights; employment discrimination; eviction from public housing; or denial of health, disability, or life insurance.”).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
See Soliz, supra note 18, at 14.
130
See, e.g., Heather Baroni et al., Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Balancing 42 C.F.R. Part
2 with Daily Healthcare Operations, 31 HEALTH L. 1, 3–4 (2018).
131
See Nicolas Terry et al., COVID-19: Substance Use Disorder, Privacy, and the CARES Act,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(June
8,
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377
/hblog20200605.571907/ [https://perma.cc/9DRL-UBQ3].
132
See Campbell, supra note 15, at 42.
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dependently, with little need for communicating with external parties.133 A simple treatment center easily managed Part 2’s stringent requirements.134
Since Part 2’s enactment, however, SUD treatment’s gradual integration into mainstream medical settings has complicated SUD treatment.135 Providers have criticized Part 2 for several reasons.136 First,
providers were concerned that the extra layer of protection reinforced,
rather than mitigated, stigma against individuals with SUD, as was
originally intended, due to the necessity of segregating SUD records
from the rest of an individual’s medical history.137 Next, providers complained that the requirements hindered their ability to provide integrated care—not only did Part 2 requirements lead to significant administrative burden, but they were confusing and led to difficulty
updating patient records.138 Updated records are imperative for SUD
treatment due to the dangerous interactions among prescription and
illicit substances, which can be especially problematic during emergency situations.139 Moreover, empirical research has shown that integrated care is critical to successful recovery from addiction.140
Overall, the burdens of Part 2 resulted in difficulty reconciling privacy protections with the modern, fluid teams that worked to meet patient needs.141 In response, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration142 (SAMHSA) repeatedly attempted to align
Part 2 with contemporary health systems.143 SAMHSA made regulatory
changes to Part 2 in January 2017, January 2018,144 and August 2020,
each time resulting in intense debate.145 While health providers tended
133

Id.
Id.
135
Id. at 42–43.
136
Schaper et al., supra note 94, at 107.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. (noting that, for example, if a provider is unaware that a patient is undergoing medication-assisted treatment, that physician may prescribe a medication that interacts with the opioiddependence medication, increasing the risk of side effects).
140
See, e.g., Caroline Carney, The Importance of Integrated Care in Fighting Opioid Use Disorder, AJMC (May 18, 2018), www.ajmc.com/contributor/caroline-carney/2018/05/the-importanceof-integrated-care-in-fighting-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/E82M-KAMA].
141
Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,986, 43,002
(July 15, 2020).
142
SAMHSA is an agency within HHS that advances public health efforts to reduce the impact
of substance use-related disorders and mental illness. See About Us, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/LN2C-ARF9].
143
Campbell, supra note 15, at 43.
144
Id.
145
See Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,986, 42,987
(July 15, 2020).
134
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to support the revisions, advocacy groups raised concerns that the
changes limited patient protections.146
E. Antidiscrimination Protections: Another Avenue for Relief
For individuals with SUD, antidiscrimination protections can serve
as a supplement to fragmented, inconsistent, or otherwise limited privacy protections. Privacy and antidiscrimination laws are conceptually
related.147 Protecting privacy can prevent discrimination by restricting
access to the information that forms the basis of discrimination,148 and
antidiscrimination law can provide protection after private information
is released. Some individuals with SUD are protected from discrimination by federal disability law.149
Opioid addiction is a disability under § 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973150 (Rehabilitation Act), the Americans with Disabilities Act151 (ADA), § 1557 of the Affordable Care Act152 (ACA), and
§§ 3601–3619 of the Fair Housing Act.153 Disability law protects only a
limited set of individuals with SUD: (1) “individuals who have successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program, or are otherwise rehabilitated, and are not currently engaged in the illegal use of
drugs,” (2) individuals who are participating in a supervised drug rehabilitation program and are currently not engaging in the illegal use of
drugs,” and (3) “individuals who are only erroneously thought to be engaging in the illegal use of drugs.”154 Thus patients with SUD who are
currently using illegal drugs, as opposed to recovering individuals who
are not currently using, are not protected under existing antidiscrimination law.155
Whether the law considers an individual to be “currently using” illegal drugs depends on the circumstances.156 The House Report for the
146

Campbell, supra note 15, at 43.
See Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2097, 2097 (2015).
148
Id.
149
OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FACT SHEET: DRUG ADDICTION AND
FEDERAL DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/drug-addiction-aand-federal-disability-rights-laws-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6PU-859S].
150
29 U.S.C. § 791 (1973).
151
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1992).
152
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001).
153
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968).
154
OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 149.
155
OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 24, at 6-34.
But see OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 149 (noting that current
illegal use of drugs is not grounds for denial of health services).
156
U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., SHARING THE DREAM: IS THE ADA ACCOMMODATING ALL?, ch. 4 (Oct.
2000), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ada/main.htm [https://perma.cc/YM2M-H9DP] (ebook) (“There
147
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ADA clarifies that individuals with “current” abuse are individuals
whose illegal use of drugs is recent enough to support a reasonable belief that the individual is presently using drugs.157 The trier of fact,
therefore, is given discretion in determining whether an individual is
currently using or in recovery,158 and the “current use” versus “recovery” distinction carries a significant degree of weight.159
Relatedly, federal antidiscrimination law excludes any individual
with SUD who “pose[s] a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace.”160 Entities, such as employers, are entitled to make individualized assessments of risk based on reasonable
judgement that relies on “current medical knowledge or on the best
available objective evidence, to ascertain the nature, duration, and severity of the risk.”161 They can also consider “the probability that the
potential injury will actually occur” and “whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.”162
Courts have struggled to evaluate these risks.163 Often, individuals with
SUD are engaged in illegal activity, and detoxification and rehabilitation frequently require extended absence from work, making these exclusions more problematic for individuals with SUD relative to individuals with other disabilities.164
Despite these challenges, administrative agencies and courts interpreting federal disability laws have required employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” for otherwise qualified individuals.165 For example, individuals receiving medication-assisted treatment—a type of
treatment using federally approved medications such as methadone,
is insufficient law on the issue right now and it is causing great difficulty for employers to determine exactly when they may take discipline against an employee.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
157
See H.R. REP. No. 101-596, at 64 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565,
573.
158
See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., SHARING THE DREAM: IS THE ADA ACCOMMODATING ALL?, supra
note 156; see also Elie G. Aoun & Paul S. Appelbaum, Ten Years After the ADA Amendment Act
(2008): The Relationship Between ADA Employment Discrimination and Substance Use Disorders,
70 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 596, 601 (2019) (noting that some courts consider the “duration of abstinence, the potential impact of substance use on work performance, and the nature of the job”).
159
See OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 149.
160
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
161
CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL SERIES 38,
INTEGRATING SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND VOCATIONAL SERVICES 121 (2000) (citation omitted).
162
Id. (quotation mark and citation omitted).
163
See Anne Robbins, Note, Employment Discrimination Against Substance Abusers: The Federal Response, 33 B.C. L. REV. 155, 157 (1991) (“The ADA [ ] leaves unclear whether courts should
hold substance abusers to the same, or to a different, standard than they hold individuals with
other disabilities.”).
164
Id. at 156.
165
Id. at 163.
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buprenorphine, and naltrexone—in theory cannot be denied protection
under federal disability law on the basis of that treatment as long as
they are otherwise qualified.166 Yet employers may still heavily scrutinize patients participating in medication-assisted treatment and implement drug-free workplaces that disincentivize or prohibit their employment.167 Employers may have difficulty providing accommodations
because individuals that are enrolled in or have completed SUD treatment programs relapse at an unpredictable rate.168 Public employers
can test employees for substance use and terminate employees who
have relapsed regardless of whether they are enrolled in treatment.169
It is challenging to predict what a reasonable accommodation might entail because judges are given discretion in this determination.170
Consequently, predicting when an individual with SUD will be protected under antidiscrimination laws is complicated. Individuals with
SUD who are “currently using” illegal drugs or who pose a direct threat
to the health and safety of others are not protected, but there is no
bright line to determine who is currently using or a direct threat. Moreover, even though employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations for otherwise qualified individuals, the high degree of judicial discretion in defining both “reasonable” and “qualified” makes
determinations unpredictable.
In light of this unpredictability, both antidiscrimination and privacy laws leave individuals with SUD vulnerable to discrimination. The
CARES Act, however, may offer a solution.

166

OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 149.
Francis, supra note 5, at 907–08 (explaining, for example, that drug-free workplace policies
such as no-tolerance, random drug testing expose individuals with SUD to adverse consequences
at work).
168
Robbins, supra note 163, at 156.
169
See Michael S. Cecere & Philip B. Rosen, Legal Implications of Substance Abuse Testing in
the Workplace, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 861–65 (1987). Because courts have found substance
use testing by public employers to be a search and seizure subject to Fourth Amendment balancing,
this ability is not without limit. Id. at 861. But “[w]hat is unreasonable in a given case depends
upon its facts,” and courts are likely to find government interference to be less objectionable where
the government regulates for public safety. Id.
170
See, e.g., McElrath v. Kemp, 714 F. Supp. 23, 27–28 (D.D.C. 1989) (determining that an
employer did not offer a reasonable accommodation after the employer did not consider the possibility of offering leave without pay to undergo treatment); Lemere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275,
278 (D.D.C. 1988) (determining that a reasonable accommodation might include a leave of absence); Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 949–50 (D.D.C. 1988) (determining that an employer did not offer a reasonable accommodation after the employer did not offer the employee a
second opportunity for treatment when she relapsed).
167

484

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2021

III. THE CARES ACT PART 2 MODIFICATIONS
On March 27, 2020, President Trump signed the CARES Act into
Section 3321 of the CARES Act “substantially amended several
sections of the Part 2 authorizing statute.”172 The statutory amendments went into effect on March 27, 2021.173 These modifications (the
“CARES Act Modifications”) were prompted by the ongoing need to better situate Part 2 among advances in the healthcare system.174 Congress intended the modifications to more closely align Part 2 standards
with HIPAA and allow greater flexibility for healthcare providers to
share records.175 These changes are a result of the ongoing movement
to facilitate information exchange while balancing the legitimate privacy concerns of patients.176 This Part examines the CARES Act Modifications in detail. It first reviews the new reduced consent requirements, then discusses the new antidiscrimination provision. It
ultimately juxtaposes the consent requirements with the antidiscrimination provision and evaluates their balance of protections.
law.171

A. Reduced Consent Requirements: A Step Back
Significantly, the CARES Act Modifications reduced previous written patient consent requirements (hereinafter referred to as the “Consent Modifications”) in § 2.31. The original Part 2 consent provision required written patient consent each time that information was shared
outside the treatment facility177—a more stringent requirement than
HIPAA’s open sharing allowance among providers for treatment purposes. The Consent Modifications, however, permit a patient to give
written consent “once for all [ ] future uses or disclosures for purposes
of treatment, payment, and health care operations,” as permitted by
HIPAA.178 The Consent Modifications coincide with recent regulatory
171

Pub. L. No. 116-136, 132 Stat. 281 (2020); see also Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder
Patient Records, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,986, 42,987 (July 15, 2020).
172
Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,987.
173
Id. As of April 9, 2021, SAMHSA began working with the HHS Office for Civil Rights on a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to implement CARES Act Modifications in new regulations. Statement on 42 CFR Part 2 Amendments Process, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN. (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.samhsa.gov/newsroom/statements/2021/42-cfr-part-2-amendments-process [https://perma.cc/R32N-XTA2].
174
Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,987.
175
Id.
176
See Gina Bertolini et al., What Comes Next for Part 2? The CARES Act’s Surprising Overhaul of the Controversial Law Protecting the Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Records,
JD SUPRA (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-comes-next-for-part-2-thecares-70074/ [https://perma.cc/56YA-YVJW].
177
Schaper et al., supra note 94, at 106.
178
42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). The regulations provide a mechanism for
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changes to Part 2179 that allow treatment programs to disclose dispensing and prescribing data to prescription drug monitoring programs180
(commonly referred to as “PDMPs”), subject to consent and as required
by state law.181
In the past, reductions in Part 2 consent requirements have
sparked concern—namely, fear that records would be given to “interconnected health care systems, unknown future entities, and vendors
with only one general consent and signature.”182 The harm of such disclosures lies in reduced patient control over information sharing, as information is shared with neither patient knowledge nor explicit consent.183 Widespread sharing, due to both the Consent Modifications and
PDMP permission, increases the risk that SUD information will be misused.184 While HIPAA has always allowed wide data sharing, the spread
of SUD data has the potential to be used in an especially pernicious
manner given the considerable stigmatization surrounding SUD diagnoses.185 There is also risk of harm stemming from currently limited
scrutiny over PDMP functioning, especially as the opioid crisis has resulted in the rapid expansion in number, scope, and legal authority of
PDMPs.186
A particular concern in light of the Consent Modifications and wide
sharing capabilities is that Part 2—like HIPAA—does not provide a private right of action.187 Until recently, penalties for Part 2 violations carried criminal fines, and individuals were required to report violations
to SAMHSA and the Department of Justice.188 Federal enforcement of
revoking consent at 42 C.F.R. § 290dd-2(b)(1)(c).
179
42 C.F.R. § 2.36 (2020).
180
PDMPs are state-based programs that track prescription patterns. Terry et al., supra note
131. Practitioners, state medical and pharmacy boards, and others can access PDMP information
about prescribing and patient behaviors and monitor signs of prescription diversion, misuse, and
abuse. Michael C. Barnes & Daniel C. McClughen, Warm Handoffs: The Duty of and Legal Issues
Surrounding Emergency Departments in Reducing the Risk of Subsequent Drug Overdoses, 48 U.
MEM. L. REV. 1099, 1150 (2018).
181
Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,986, 42,988
(July 15, 2020); see also Soliz, supra note 18, at 18 (“A critical component of identifying, understanding, and combatting the opioid epidemic has been access to information about . . . who is suffering, where, why, how they are being treated, and are those treatments successful.”).
182
Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43,003.
183
Id.
184
Leo Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring to Address the Overdose Crisis: Ideology Meets Reality, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 167–68 (2018).
185
See Terry et al., supra note 131.
186
Beletsky, supra note 184, at 167–179 (emphasizing that government surveillance systems
can perpetuate biases and have a disproportionate impact on underprivileged citizens).
187
See, e.g., Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 446–49 (4th Cir. 2000); Chapa v. Adams, 168 F.3d
1036, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 1999); Ellison v. Cocke County, 63 F.3d 467, 470 (6th Cir. 1995).
188
Mitchell Berger, Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records Final Rule (42
CFR Part 2), RSAT CONF. (Aug. 2017), https://www.rsat-tta.com/Files/Confidentiality-Rules-and-
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Part 2 was practically nonexistent.189 The CARES Act, however, aligned
Part 2 penalties with the penalties under HIPAA.190 There is hope that
aligning Part 2 enforcement with HIPAA enforcement will result in
heightened federal scrutiny for SUD records and that this scrutiny will
help to counterbalance the CARES Act Modifications that permit broad
record sharing.191
B. New Antidiscrimination Provision: A Step Forward
The new antidiscrimination provision may also help to counterbalance the Consent Modifications. As discussed above,192 Part 2 was originally enacted because lawmakers did not want to deter individuals
from seeking out treatment for fear of arrest; loss of parental rights;
employment discrimination; eviction from public housing; or denial of
health, disability, or life insurance.193 Legislators reasoned that especially stringent protections for SUD records minimized the risk that
other entities would be able to easily access personal health information
and discriminate using that information.194 The CARES Act Modifications have increased the risk that health information is accessible to
other entities, but this risk is counterbalanced with a new antidiscrimination provision.195 The provision prohibits discrimination by any entity on the basis of information received from SUD records for
healthcare, employment, worker’s compensation, housing, and social
services and benefits.196
The new, broad antidiscrimination provision in the CARES Act
Modifications provides an additional avenue of protection for individuals with SUD following disclosure of treatment records. The antidiscrimination provision was included to balance out the reduced privacy

Regulations_BERGER-(1) [https://perma.cc/V3UB-MYT4].
189
See Alex Dworkowitz, The CARES Act Brings Key Changes to the SUD Confidentiality Statute, JD SUPRA (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-cares-act-brings-keychanges-to-the-55845/ [https://perma.cc/GP8G-KY6E]. It has been suggested that Part 2 was likely
to be construed in favor of the violator, similar to other criminal statutes. Berger, supra note 188.
190
Bertolini et al., supra note 176.
191
Dworkowitz, supra note 189.
192
Supra Part II.C.
193
Schaper et al., supra note 94, at 106.
194
Id.
195
See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(i); Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 85
Fed. Reg. 42,986, 42,987, n.3 (July 15, 2020).
196
See Adam J. Hepworth & Jennifer J. Hennessy, COVID-19: CARES Act Overhauls Federal
Substance Use Disorder Privacy Law, FOLEY & LARDNER (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/covid19-cares-act-federal-substance-privacy-law
[https://perma.cc/WN7C-STV8].
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protection under Part 2 following its alignment with HIPAA standards.197 Moreover, the modifications incorporate a rhetorical change
from “substance abuse” to “substance use disorder” that commentators
perceive as an additional effort toward combatting stigmatization.198
The impact of the antidiscrimination provision and rhetorical change
remains to be seen; likely, the scope of the impact lies in the government’s enforcement.199
C. COVID-19: Tipping the Scale
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinvigorated discourse regarding information privacy protections in the healthcare sector more broadly.200
Social distancing mandates have made access to healthcare more difficult across the board, but treatment inaccessibility is a special concern
for patients with SUD.201 Without treatment continuity, the risk of relapse and withdrawal is dangerously elevated and compromises longterm treatment success.202 Social distancing increases the risk of overdose without intervention as well as difficulty accessing resources like
syringe services programs.203 Increased caseload at emergency departments reduces the likelihood that SUD cases will be prioritized when
making resource determinations.204
When the pandemic began to sweep the nation, federal agencies
were quick to waive several rigid legal requirements that had previously acted as barriers to treatment.205 To improve treatment access
during the pandemic, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) temporarily
suspended barriers to the use of telehealth services in providing medication-assisted treatment.206 SAMHSA increased flexibility in SUD

197

Terry et al., supra note 131.
Id.
199
Id.
200
See, e.g., Sheila Limmroth, Influence of COVID-19 on a HIPAA Training and Education
Program, 22 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 49, 49 (2020).
201
G. Caleb Alexander et al., An Epidemic in the Midst of a Pandemic: Opioid Use Disorder
and COVID-19, 173 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 57, 57 (2020).
202
See, e.g., Jeanne A. Schaefer et al., Continuity of Care Practices and Substance Use Disorder
Patients’ Engagement in Continuing Care, 43 MED. CARE 1234, 1239 (2005).
203
Nora D. Volkow, Collision of the COVID-19 and Addiction Epidemics, 173 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 61 (2020). Syringe service programs are community-based programs that are intended to facilitate access to sterile syringes and other equipment to individuals suffering from
SUD. Syringe Services Programs, NIDA, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/syringe-servicesprograms [https://perma.cc/2YLX-R5HZ] (last accessed July 28, 2021). They are intended to reduce
the spread of infectious diseases. Id.
204
Volkow, supra note 203.
205
Oliva, supra note 20.
206
Thomas B. Ferrante & Sunny J. Levine, COVID-19: DEA Confirms Public Health Emergency Exception for Telemedicine Prescribing of Controlled Substances, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
198
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pharmacotherapy by allowing patients to obtain a greater supply of
medication doses and waiving requirements for written patient consent
forms.207 Overall, the pandemic has amplified the need for integrated
treatment among SUD service providers, who face real challenges in
ensuring patient safety when prescribing medications to those at risk
for overdose.208
Moreover, the pandemic has heightened the need for comprehensive case management for individuals with SUD, ideally with connections to housing and social services.209 SUD patients often face unstable
employment, which, combined with loss of housing and food insecurity,
contributes to relapse risk.210 According to some estimates, “suspected
overdoses increased nationally by 18 percent, 29 percent, and 42 percent in March, April, and May 2020, respectively.”211 Experts speculate
that the COVID-19 SUD treatment reforms are not sustainable solutions to the opioid crisis that has been exacerbated by the pandemic.212
IV. PART 2 AND COVID-19: ASKING FOR FORGIVENESS, NOT
PERMISSION
Barriers to SUD treatment, as highlighted by the pandemic, are
tremendous.213 The CARES Act Modifications were intended to improve
access to integrated care after an individual seeks treatment.214 The liberalization of previously stringent Part 2 privacy protections, however,
has raised concern that SUD treatment information will be misused,215
and options for recovery following misuse are limited. The new Part 2
antidiscrimination provision helps temper criticism and may serve as a
legislative form of balancing.216 Aligning Part 2 penalties with HIPAA
penalties may increase scrutiny of Part 2 compliance, which also helps
to counter privacy concerns.217

(Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/covid19-public-health-exception-telemedicine [https://perma.cc/L55R-FNLP].
207
COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Response and 42 CFR Part 2 Guidance, SUBSTANCE
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default
/files/covid-19-42-cfr-part-2-guidance-03192020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3TK-8G5P].
208
Alexander et al., supra note 201, at 57.
209
Id. at 57–58.
210
Id. at 57.
211
Oliva, supra note 20.
212
Id.
213
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Samuels et al., Innovation During COVID-19: Improving Addiction
Treatment Access, 14 J. ADDICTION MED. e8 (2020).
214
Frazier & Connelly, supra note 7, at 42.
215
Beletsky, supra note 184, at 167–68.
216
Bertolini et al., supra note 176.
217
Id.

467]

PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH SUD

489

Part 2 strikes a balance, but is it enough? Part 2 is illustrative of
the difficult equilibrium between individual privacy expectations and
the public health interest in efficient and effective SUD treatment.218
The modifications also illustrate the potential for robust antidiscrimination protections to provide facilitate recovery following misuse of personal health information. The remainder of this Comment will address
whether the CARES Act Modifications strike an adequate and sustainable balance between individual privacy interests and societal interests
in public health and data aggregation. Further, it will examine the potential for alternative privacy protections to impact this balance and
suggest that the pandemic may tip the scale, underscoring the need for
heightened legal protections for individuals receiving SUD treatment.
Last, this Comment will evaluate whether the CARES Act Modifications are sensitive to widespread stigmatization concerns and scrutinize whether the Part 2 antidiscrimination provision can close gaps in
privacy protections available to individuals with SUD.
A. Privacy Protections Are Unstable
As described above, there are currently three forms of protection
for an individual’s right to information privacy: constitutional, common
law, and statutory protections.219 All three are unstable and inadequate, and they share a set of similar problems. First, existing privacy
protections are fragmented and leave gaps in protection.220 Second, the
repeated fluctuations in the existing legal framework foster lingering
doubts as to the value of privacy and the restrictions necessary to protect it.221 New statutes and court decisions can reduce common law protections,222 and legislative and regulatory protections are subject to similar instability.223 Legislation can be amended or repealed according to
the whims of majoritarian public sentiment.224
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It is important to critically examine the impact of public sentiment
on information privacy. One problem with subjecting privacy protections to public sentiment is that, once sentiment swings against privacy, it is difficult to go back.225 In the case of SUD treatment records,
once information is shared across facilities, it may be difficult for patients to regain control over that information in the future. The rapid
pace of PDMP emergence, coupled with the recent PDMP permission in
Part 2, additionally increases the risk that information spread will get
out of hand.226 Should an individual with SUD wish to revoke consent
for data sharing, which is allowed under Part 2,227 it is unclear how far
revocation extends. It is possible, and perhaps likely, that revoked consent only prohibits future sharing; previously shared information,
whether to healthcare facilities, insurers, or PDMPs, is a sunk cost.
Of course, statute-based protections can attempt to implement or
recalibrate the balance that courts have struck in applying privacy protections.228 Legislative balancing, however, is fraught with problems.
While the federal government might appear to be a logical source of
privacy protection, it is also among the greatest collectors of information.229 There is a strong argument that, wherever the government
can collect more information than it needs or wrongfully disclose information, individuals must have protection from the government itself.230
There is a balance in preserving the government’s ability to be efficient
while also protecting individual privacy interests. The inherent conflict,
however, between the government as a protector and as a collector of
personal information casts doubt on the efficacy of relying on state and
federal legislatures to protect individual information privacy interests.231
In the context of SUD treatment records, the government has a robust interest in gaining access to personal information: Not only is in-
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formation sharing a vital part of integrated care, but aggregated treatment information in the form of state PDMPs is considered a valuable
part of combatting the opioid epidemic.232 Yet there is little evidence
that PDMPs actually promote public health.233 In light of law enforcement access to PDMP records, scholars have argued that PDMPs exacerbate, rather than mitigate, overdose rates.234 Scholars are critical of
the public-health-facing frame surrounding PDMPs and have suggested
that PDMPs are “criminal and regulatory surveillance tools dressed up
in public-health-promoting rhetoric.”235 It remains unclear, therefore,
whether the legislative balancing of individual privacy protections and
public health interests in the CARES Act Modifications is sufficient to
protect individuals with SUD from privacy violations.
Problematic legislative balancing means that courts have a critical
role in protecting patient privacy. Courts can, and should, reduce ambiguity and gaps in privacy protections.236 There are two avenues for
court action: constitutional interpretation and common law development. There is no clear-cut standard, however, to evaluate whether privacy protections are adequate.237 The Ninth Circuit, for example, recognizes no minimum standard for alleging an infringement of one’s
information privacy rights.238 If the Supreme Court were to interpret
Whalen to establish a constitutional right to information privacy, arguably inadequate Part 2 balancing might be rectified using a unified
standard to evaluate the strength of privacy protections.
B. A Constitutional Right to Information Privacy is Unlikely to Be
Helpful
The Supreme Court has declined to explicitly declare a right to information privacy following Whalen, despite having several chances to
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clarify whether such a right exists.239 Moreover, circuit courts are inconsistent in interpreting Whalen—while some circuits unequivocally
affirm the right to information privacy, others do so only in certain circumstances.240 Circuits also evaluate the right in different ways.241 Circuit balancing tests demonstrate how susceptible a fundamental right
to information privacy may be in instances of strong societal interests.242
In light of the ongoing opioid epidemic, balancing tests are problematic for patient privacy advocates. Privacy advocates have generally
struggled to successfully argue that individual privacy interests outweigh the public interest in electronic databases, such as PDMPs, that
(at least ostensibly) serve a public health function.243 Of course, a constitutional right to information privacy might help close gaps in existing
privacy protections available to individuals with SUD.244 However, to
truly close these gaps, courts would need to be willing to find that individual privacy rights outweigh societal interest in treatment information.245 Thus far, courts have typically failed to do so.246 It is unclear,
therefore, what functional value a right to information privacy would
have to individuals with SUD; if such a right exists but no plaintiff is
able to benefit using it, the right is inadequate.247 There is little value
in recognizing a right that no court upholds in practice.248
There is a plausible argument that the treatment-deterrent effect
of inadequate privacy protections is a matter of societal interest that
cuts against the strong public need for access,249 but Whalen is instruc-
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tive here. In Whalen, the Court recognized that the prescription monitoring file would potentially deter some patients from treatment.250 The
Court still found that the individual privacy interest was not violated251
and denied that the physician-patient relationship was violated by
mandated disclosure.252 Whalen exemplifies judicial balancing of the
public interest with individual privacy concerns in the prescription
monitoring context,253 and patient privacy advocates will likely struggle
to circumvent Whalen in similar situations.
C. A Part 2 Standard of Care Is Only a Limited Solution
While constitutional protection seems to be an unlikely option for
sustainable privacy protection for individuals with SUD, it is possible
that courts can use Part 2, like HIPAA, to establish a standard of care.
In cases recognizing a HIPAA-based standard of care,254 courts have determined that, to the extent that HIPAA has become common practice
for healthcare providers to follow in rendering services to patients, it
may be utilized to inform the standard of care for negligence claims.255
As Part 2 becomes more closely aligned with HIPAA, it is difficult
to argue that Part 2 cannot establish a similar foundation for a standard of care. While courts are firm that Part 2 does not establish an explicit or implicit private right of action,256 there is no case law to suggest
Part 2 cannot establish a standard of care similar to HIPAA. Case law
addressing Part 2 requirements is limited; most Part 2 cases merely
address Part 2’s role as an evidentiary barrier rather than as a mechanism for compliance.257 The dearth of case law addressing Part 2, and
the strong legislative push to align Part 2 with HIPAA, suggest that a
standard of care argument is likely to be well-received, or at least, is
not incongruous with precedent. If given the opportunity, courts should
determine that a standard of care is applicable in state negligence
claims using Part 2 as a guidepost. Such a standard could help to close
privacy gaps for those with SUD.
250
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D. Antidiscrimination Protections May Provide the Most Sustainable
Solution
So far, this Comment has outlined the ways in which privacy law
is problematic in the context of SUD records. Privacy protection is not
only fragmented and unstable but also unpredictable, given the strong
countervailing public interests. A constitutional right to information
privacy, while compelling as an avenue for filling privacy gaps, is inadequate in light of robust, competing public interests. A Part 2 standard
of care is also compelling but not yet developed in case law; regardless,
it is likely to be limited. Strong antidiscrimination protections, however, may provide a solution to this problem. Where privacy protections
are weakened in the CARES Act Modifications, the new antidiscrimination provision, as well as existing antidiscrimination protections, can
pick up the slack.
As discussed above,258 privacy laws and antidiscrimination laws
are related—both can protect individuals against the negative effects of
shared personal information.259 Privacy protections may be preferable
because they operate earlier in the process of discrimination by impeding access to personal information.260 Legislators and judges, however,
often hesitate to provide relief for invasions of privacy without evidence
of a tangible harm.261 In instances of purely dignitary harm, antidiscrimination law may assist privacy law.262 Further, scholars have suggested that judges are more likely to enforce a privacy protection that
is linked to an antidiscrimination initiative; antidiscrimination law can
increase the reach of privacy law by providing an additional justification for legal intervention.263
Moreover, while public interest in access to SUD records may reduce the likelihood of recovery for invasions of information privacy, public health interests are not balanced in antidiscrimination protections.
Put another way, an individual is protected under antidiscrimination
law regardless of the public interests involved. As the opioid epidemic
continues and the COVID-19 pandemic leads to treatment accessibility
barriers, it is likely that the public interest in access to SUD records
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will only intensify, which may result in weaker protections for individual privacy.264 Increasingly, the government may be asking for forgiveness, not permission, when gaining access to personal health information.
Antidiscrimination law is not free from problems as a protective
mechanism. Critics will counter that the nature of discrimination is
changing. When antidiscrimination laws were originally passed, overt,
intentional exclusion was the dominant form of discrimination rather
than the subtle, cumulative exclusion prevalent today.265 Modern antidiscrimination law is inadequate when it requires that plaintiffs
demonstrate intent to discriminate or when it ignores smaller, more
subtle manifestations of discrimination.266 Because privacy violations
do not require a showing of intent, privacy law may provide an easier
avenue for recovery than antidiscrimination protections.267
The calculus is different in the context of SUD records. Individuals
with SUD are protected under disability law, and there is no consensus
that disability law requires a showing of intent to recover on a discrimination claim.268 While courts may require proof of intent before allowing recovery, intent is not necessary for reasonable accommodation
cases according to both the statutory text and legislative history.269 The
reasonable accommodations requirement makes disability law distinct
from other forms of antidiscrimination law.270 The requirement also
makes disability law more amenable to disparate impact claims, which
are claims that define discrimination in terms of disparate consequence
rather than purpose and motive.271 Courts should focus on whether or
not reasonable accommodations were provided, rather than discriminatory intent, in determining whether an individual can recover for discrimination based on SUD records. Further, in the event that intent is
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required, courts should show heightened sensitivity to more subtle, systemic displays of discrimination when evaluating whether the plaintiff
has offered sufficient evidence to show discriminatory intent.272
Moreover, existing antidiscrimination protections are inadequate
to protect individuals with SUD from harm because they are not protective during the entire rehabilitation process. Specifically, existing
antidiscrimination laws do not deal with the complicated issue of relapse in accord with scientific understanding, especially with regard to
current users, who are excluded from federal antidiscrimination protections.273
It is notable that current use is excluded from protection because
individuals recovering from chronic addiction are at high risk for relapse, and courts often consider relapse to be current use.274 Empirical
studies and modern medical understanding, however, indicate that relapse is “an expected part of recovery from SUD,” rather than an indication of recovery failure.275 The CARES Act antidiscrimination provision, although it does not explicitly protect current users or those using
medication-assisted treatment,276 has the potential to change such exclusion.
The most reasonable interpretation of the CARES Act antidiscrimination provision is that it protects current users. The provision reads:
“No entity shall discriminate against an individual on the basis of information received by such entity pursuant to an inadvertent or intentional disclosure of records, or information contained in records.”277 Current illegal substance use, relapse-related or otherwise, would certainly
be indicated in the “information contained in records” that are protected
under Part 2.278 Moreover, as Professors Dineen and Pendo propose, the
definition of “individual” suggests that the statutory text of the CARES
Act antidiscrimination standard does not exclude current users.279 Notably, Dineen and Pendo emphasize that the drafters were aware of ex-
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clusion under existing laws and could have incorporated similarly exclusive language in the CARES Act Modifications.280 They also postulate that the decision to protect current users is consistent with the purpose of the CARES Act Modifications: to remove fear of discrimination
with treatment.281 If Part 2 protects current users from discrimination
on the basis of SUD records, such protection could go a long way toward
combatting widespread discrimination against individuals with SUD.
Part 2 can, and should, be used to expand antidiscrimination protection to current users, but more needs to be done to strengthen existing protections. Courts can play a vital role in expanding these protections by broadly interpreting existing antidiscrimination laws and
providing evidence-based leeway in interpreting the “currently using”
language to give relapsing individuals space to recover. For example,
courts should be aware of high relapse risk and work to use objective,
evidence-based, and individualized factors to determine whether a recovering individual is a direct threat to the safety of others. Courts
should carefully evaluate each circumstance and avoid generalizing
across cases using stereotypes or assumptions. Legislative history and
interpretive guidance suggest that a bright-line rule would be inappropriate for this determination.282 While a bright-line rule, such as a timing-based trigger for antidiscrimination protection, would ease application and predictability of disability law in SUD cases,283 such a rule
would be out of touch with medical understanding, which suggests that
recovery is an individualized process that is highly dependent on an individual’s support network and other circumstantial factors.
V.

CONCLUSION

The CARES Act Modifications reduce the stringent privacy protections available to individuals with SUD, just as the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted problematic barriers to treatment and services.
The CARES Act Modifications also include a notable antidiscrimination
provision, which may help to counterbalance the reductions in privacy
protections. The Part 2 antidiscrimination provision can easily be interpreted to expand protection to current users of illegal substances, who
until now were unable to find protection under existing antidiscrimination law.
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While the Part 2 provision can go a long way to protecting individuals with SUD, stigmatization and discrimination against individuals
with SUD remain prevalent, and more needs to be done. A constitutional right to information privacy, while appealing, is unlikely to be
helpful in filling gaps in privacy protection for individuals with SUD
due to the strong public interest in integrated care and governmental
monitoring of prescription records. Further, a private right of action under Part 2 may help to fill protection gaps but is likely to be limited and
has not yet been developed in case law. As the pandemic demonstrates,
treatment discontinuity can be devastating to recovering individuals.284
The CARES Act Modifications exemplify legislative recognition of treatment and administrative barriers, difficulty providing integrated care,
and fear of discrimination. Courts should expand existing antidiscrimination protections to provide ready accommodation for relapse in recovering individuals. Antidiscrimination protections are the most sustainable solution to the SUD privacy problem as the government
increasingly asks for forgiveness, not permission, when accessing private SUD treatment records.
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